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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHELIA ANN COX, SUSAN KELLER 
and SUSAN SMITH, 
Plaintiffs-Appellant, 
vs 
ORRIN HATCH, UNION MEMBERS 
FOR HATCH COMMITTEE, FRIENDS 
FOR ORRIN HATCH COMMITTEE, 
HATCH ELECTION COMMITTEE, 
MICHAEL LEAVITT and JOHN DOES 
i-x, 
Defendants-Respondent. 
Case No. 19257 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action for injunctive relief and damages 
based upon a statutory claim for abuse of personal identity-
pursuant to §45-3-1 et seq. Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended) and tort claims for defamation and invasion of 
privacy. (R.13-18) 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
This matter came before the Third District Court 
for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, 
District Judge presiding, on defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
on March 28, 1983 at 2:00 p.m. (R.49). The Court heard the 
arguments of counsel for the respective parties and took the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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matter under advisement to consider the memorandum filed by 
the parties and to further consider the entire file. On 
April 5, 1983 the Court entered its memorandum decision that 
"the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be granted on 
constitutional grounds alone and the claims for abuse of 
identity, defamation or invasion of privacy espoused by the 
plaintiff need not be addressed." (R.84-86) On April 19, 
1983, the District Court entered its final order of dismissal 
with prejudice as against Michael Leavitt and Orrin Hatch. 
(R.101-103) It is from this order that appellants appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the order entered by 
the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, Honorable 
Timothy R. Hansen, presiding, dismissing plaintiffs1 complaint 
with prejudice and request an order of remand to the District 
Court for a full trial on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants are employees of the United States 
Postal Service, employed at the Main Salt Lake City Post 
Office, located at 2100 South Redwood Road. They are and 
i 
were members of the American Postal Workers Union. (R.13) 
On or about Labor Day, September 6, 1982, respondent Orrin 
Hatch, along with his agents, came to the appellants1 place 
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of employment for the purpose of taking photographs to be 
used in the political campaign for re-election to the United 
State Senate of respondent Hatch. (R.14) A photograph was 
taken of appellants standing near respondent Hatch. (R.14, 
45, 53, 54, 90) This photograph was subsequently printed in 
a newspaper-like advertisement entitled, SENATOR ORRIN HATCH 
LABOR LETTER, UNION MEMBERS FOR HATCH COMMITTEE. (R.45) 
This publication was authorized and paid for by the Friends 
of Orrin Hatch Committee and was authorized by the Hatch 
election committee and the respondents. Appellants1 photograph 
was used in this publication without their consent or author-
ization. The use of this photograph in the political advertise-
ment described above, implied that appellants approved or 
endorsed the re-election of respondent Hatch. Appellants 
have never endorsed the re-election of Hatch. Further, as 
employees of the federal government, they are specifically 
precluded by federal law from publically approving or endorsing 
any political candidate or actively participating in a 
political campaign. (R.16) The appellants were harmed as 
a result of the conduct of the respondents. 
Subsequent to the publication of the appellants1 
photograph in respondents1advertisement, appellants were 
investigated by their employers and supervisors and their 
union regarding the extent of their involvement and partic-
ipation in Hatchfs campaign. 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS' 
AMENDED COMPLAINT IN THAT THE USE OF 
APPELLANTS1 PHOTOGRAPH IS NOT CONSTIT-
UTIONALLY PROTECTED SPEECH OR EXPRESSION 
It is well settled that the First Amendment freedom 
of expression is not absolute. 
i It is clear that there is no "absolute" right to 
freedom of expression. The government may impose 
certain limitations on even clearly First Amendment 
conduct; regulation of time, place and manner, for 
example, is permissible. U.S. vs. Baranski, 484 
Fed. 2d 556, 569 (1973). ~ " 
The fact that some government restrictions placed 
upon freedom of expression create a ,fchilling effect" in the 
exercise of these rights is not sufficient to prohibit this 
regulation. In Younger vs. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51; 77 L. 
Ed. 2d 669; 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971) The Supreme Court stated: 
. . . the existence of a "chilling effect," even 
in the area of First Amendment Rights, has never 
been considered a sufficient basis, in and of it-
self, for prohibiting State action. Where a 
statute does not directly abridge free speech, 
but - while regulating a subject within the State's 
power - tends to have the incidental effect of 
inhibiting First Amendment Rights, it is well 
settled that the statute can be upheld if the 
effect on speech is minor in relation to the 
need for control of the conduct and a lack of 
alternative means for doing so. 
In this case, respondents Hatch and Leavitt prepared 
a political advertisement for the purpose of obtaining support 
and endorsement for Hatch's re-election to the United States 
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Senate. This is clear from the nature of the advertisement. 
(R.45) The Court will note that on the last page of this 
publication a return mail "reply" card is included. In this 
reply, respondents specifically solicit endorsements and request 
a signed consent under the statement MYesff, I will endorse 
Senator Hatch for re-election and allow my name to be used 
in advertisements." [emphasis added](R.45) Clearly, respondents 
knew that consent was required for the use of one's name as 
a portion of an advertisement endorsing Hatch's reelection 
effort. 
Utah Code Annotated §45-3-3 (1953, as amended) 
defines abuse of personal identity as follows: 
The personal identity of an individual is abused 
if: (1) an advertisement is published in which 
the personal identity of that individual is used 
in a manner which expresses or implies that the 
individual approves, endorses, has endorsed or 
will endorse the specific subject matter of the 
advertisement; and (2) consent has not been 
obtained for such from the individual, . . . 
Respondents contend that this statute is a un-
constitutional restriction on their right to free expression. 
This, notwithstanding their attempts to obtain this required 
consent from other potential endorsers. In the instant 
case, appellants were never asked if they would permit their 
photograph with the Senator to be used in an advertisement. 
They were never informed that this photograph would be so 
used by the respondents. They were not even extended the 
-5-
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opportunity to make the choice as to the use of their likeness 
or identity in this photograph and by the respondents. To 
the contrary, respondents made this choice for the appellants. 
Clearly the legislative intent in the adoption of 
the abuse of personal identity statute was to provide an 
individual a choice as to whether or not he or she will 
allow their likeness or their name to be used in an advertisement, 
endorsing some subject matter. The provisions of this 
statute show that the legislature intended to avoid such 
wrongful use by requiring consent to be obtained prior to 
the use of one's identity in an advertisement. This statute 
is a reasonable restriction on the manner of expression. As 
the Supreme Court stated in Younger vs. Harris, supra, 
Just as the incidental "chilling effect" of such 
statutes does not automatically render them un-
constitutional, so the chilling effect admittedly 
can result from the very existence of certain laws 
on the statute books does not in itself justify 
prohibiting the state from carrying out the 
important and necessary task of enforcing these 
laws against socially harmful conduct that the 
State believes in good faith to be punishable 
under its laws and the constitution. 
In the case at bar, the statute is one of general 
applicability. It in no way restricts or regulates the 
content of any expression. The Utah abuse of personal 
identity statute requires only that prior to the use of onefs 
likeness or name in a context which implies an endorsement, 
the speaker or publisher must obtain consent from the putative 
-6-
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endorser so as to avoid deceptive or unfair endorsement in 
advertising. 
It is clear that the First Amendment does not 
invalidate every incidental burdening of the press 
that may result from the enforcement of civil or 
criminal statutes of general applicability. Under 
prior cases, otherwise valid laws serving substan-
tial public interests may be enforced against the 
press as against others, despite the possible 
burden that may be imposed. The Court has em-
phasized that MThe publisher of a newspaper 
has no special immunity from the application of 
general laws. He has no special privileges 
to invade the rights of others. [Emphasis added] 
Branzburg vs. Hayes 408 U.S.T65, 683; 33 L. 
Ed. 2d 626, 640; 92 S. Ct. 2646 (1972) citing 
Associated Press vs. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-133; 
81 L. Ed. 953, 961; 57 S. Ct. 650 (1937) 
The respondents in this case should be allowed no 
greater protection than the organized press or any other citizen. 
The Utah legislature has specifically adopted methods by 
which an advertiser, be he a political advertiser or otherwise, 
may obtain and utilize the endorsements of others. This 
legislative purpose is clearly meant to avoid the invasion 
of the rights of others. 
The prevailing view is that the press is not free 
to publish with immunity everything and anything 
it desires to publish. Branzburg v. Hayes, supra. 
The appellants submit that respondents1 failure to 
comply with the provisions of §45-3-1 et seq Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended) is not justified based upon 
their allegations that the unconsented use of the photograph 
of the appellants is "political speech11 and is therefore 
-7-
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unconditionally protected by the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. It is clear that some restrictions, 
even in the area of "political speech," are valid. 
The guarantees of the first amendment have never 
meant "that people who want to propagandize protests 
or views have a constitutional right to do so 
wherever, however and whenever they please." 
Greer vs. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836; 47 L. Ed. 2d 
505, 513; 96 S, Ct. 1211 (1976) citing Adderly vs. 
Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48; 17 L. Ed. 2d 149; 87 S. 
Ct. 242. 
In this case respondents apparently determined 
that Senator Hatch's views on labor and unions needed to be 
propagandized in his effort to obtain support from Utah 
union members in his bid for re-election. This decision 
alone, in the context of a re-election, does not extend any 
constitutional right to propagandize Senator Hatch's views, 
whenever, however and wherever he or his campaign staff choose. 
. . . the essence of time, place or manner 
regulation lies in the recognition that various 
methods of speech, regardless of their content, 
may frustrate legitimate governmental goals. 
Consolidated Edison vs. Public Services Commission, 
447 U.S. 530, 535; 65 L. Ed. 2d 319, 326; 100 S. 
Ct. 2326 (1980) 
U.C.A. §45-3-1 et seq. (1953 as amended) is a 
reasonable restriction on the manner of expression one may 
employ in advertisements. This statute does not limit the 
type of advertisement to which it applies. It does not 
restrict what one may advertise but rather how one may advertise. 
Therefore, the restriction is a reasonable one of time, place 
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and manner and should not be overruled on the basis of 
respondents1 claimed constitutionally protected speech. 
POINT II 
FIRST AMENDMENT PRIVILEGES ARE NOT 
APPLICABLE IN THIS MATTER 
First Amendment guarantees of open exchanges of 
ideas and robust discussion of issues during a political 
campaign are not applicable to this case. 
The United States Supreme Court in a series of 
cases beginning with New York Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254 (1964), established that certain defamatory pub-
lications were protected by First Amendment and Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press 
in libel actions brought by public officials against critics 
of their official conduct. In such libel actions, the 
Supreme Court held that public officials were prohibited 
from recovering damages for defamation relating to official 
conduct unless it was proven that the statement was made 
with "actual malice." In the cases of Curtis Publishing Co. 
vs. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) and Associated Press vs. 
Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) the Court extended the New York 
Times standard to publications concerning "public figures." 
In Monitor Patriot Co. vs. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 
(1971), the New York Times standard was extended to apply to 
candidates for public office as well as public officials. 
-9-
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The Court stated: 
And if it be conceded that the First Amendment was 
"fashioned to assure the unfettered interchange of 
ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people11 . . . then 
it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional 
guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application 
precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political 
office. 
Id. at 272. 
The Court went on to say: 
The considerations that led us to reformulate the 
"official conduct" rule of New York Times in terms 
of "anything which might touch on official fitness 
for office" apply with special force to the case 
of the candidate. Indeed, whatever vitality the 
"official conduct" concept may retain with regard 
to occupants of public office, . . . it is clearly 
of little applicability in the context of an 
election campaign. The principle activity of a 
candidate in our political system, his "office," 
so to speak, consists in putting before the voters 
every conceivable aspect of his public and private 
life that he thinks may lead the electorate to 
gain a good impression of him. 
Id. at 274. 
The Court has, however, rejected extention of the 
constitutional privilege to include publications concerning 
any "public issue" regardless of the defamed party's status 
in Gertz vs. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). There, the Court ' 
discussed the factors which distinguish the state interest 
in compensating private individuals for defamatory statements 
from the analogous interest involved in the context of < 
public persons. 
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy 
significantly greater access to the channels of 
effective communication and hence have a more ( 
-10-
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realistic opportunity to counteract false statements 
than private individuals normally enjoy. Private 
individuals are therefore more vulnerable to 
injury, and the state interest in protecting them 
is correspondingly greater. . . more important 
than the likelihood that private individuals will 
lack effective opportunities for rebuttal, there 
is a compelling normative consideration underlying 
the distinction between public and private defamation 
plaintiffs. An individual who decides to seek govern-
mental office must accept certain necessary consequences 
of that involvement in public affairs. He runs 
the risk of closer public scrutiny than might 
otherwise be the case. Society's interest in the 
officers in government is not strictly limited to 
formal discharge of duties. . . . Those classed as 
public figures stand in similar positions. 
The Court went on to say that instances of involuntary 
public figures would be exceedingly rare and that: 
for the most part, those who attain this status 
have assumed roles of special prominence in the 
affairs of society. Some occupied positions of 
such persuasive power and influence that they are 
deemed public figures for all purposes. More 
commonly, those classed as public figures have 
thrust themselves to the forefront of particular 
public controversies in order to influence the 
resolution of the issues involved. In either 
event, they invite attention and comment . . .[A 
private individual] has not accepted public office 
or assumed an "individual role in ordering society" 
. . . he has relinquished no part of his interest 
in the protection of his own good name, and conseq-
uently he has a more compelling call on the Court 
for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory 
falsehood. Thus, private individuals are not only 
more vulnerable to injury than public officials 
and public figures, they are also more deserving 
of recovery. 
Id. at 345. 
The use of plaintiffs f photograph by the respondents 
is not within the coverage of the constitutional privilege 
-11-
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elaborated by the United States Supreme Court. Plaintiffs 
are private individuals, not public officials or public figures. 
They are not candidates for political office or those who 
"have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular 
public controversies in order to influence the resolutions 
of the issues involved.ff In fact, as postal employees, they 
are prohibited by the Hatch Act from actively participating 
in political campaigns. The misuse of their photograph in 
respondents campaign advertising is not a part of any political 
discussion on "vital public issues." Such protection would 
be given to Orrin Hatch making statements as to his opponent's 
political beliefs and policies; no such protection should be 
< 
given to Orrin Hatch publically and falsely saying that he is 
endorsed by three ordinary members of the public, the plaintiffs 
in this action. The respondents' conduct in falsely implying 
i 
endorsement of Orrin Hatch by the plaintiffs is not entitled 
to any constitutional privilege. 
\ 
-12- < 
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CONCLUSION 
The provisions of Utah Code Annotated §45-3-1 
et seq. (1953 as amended) are reasonable restrictions as to 
time, place and manner of advertising; those provisions are 
permissible restriction upon free speech even of a political 
nature. The respondents violated the Abuse of Personal Identity 
Act and are not entitled to claim immunity from that statutory 
provision simply because they were involved in a political 
campaign. 
The plaintiffs-appellants as members of the public, 
and not public figures, are entitled to the protections of 
the laws regarding defamation and invasion of privacy. Orrin 
Hatch in a political campaign has no right to falsely imply 
that the plaintiffs, union members, endorse his re-election, 
and thereby jeoparize their employment and harm their 
reputations. Free speech in the context of a political campaign 
protects the expression and debate about the candidates and 
about the issues; free speech does not allow a candidate to 
falsely imply that three ordinary members of the public support 
and endorse the re-election of Orrin Hatch. The Court below 
did not examine the merits of this action but dismissed the 
plaintiffs1 amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure with a ruling that the United States 
Constitution allows a political candidate to defame the reputation, 
-13-
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invade the privacy and abuse the identity of ordinary citizens 
with immiinity in a political campaign. Such a conclusion is 
not supported by the decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court nor by the clear intent of the Utah State Legislature 
to reasonably regulate the time, place and manner of advertising, 
The decision of the Court below should be reversed 
and this matter remanded for a full trial on the merits. 
DATED this 5th day of October, 1983. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMIT] 
BRIAN M/BARNARD 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing to Robert S. Campbell, Jr. 
of WATKISS & CAMPBELL, 310 South Main Street, Suite 1200, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, postage prepaid in the United 
States Postal Service on the 5th day of October, 198^<^ 
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